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CASE NOTES
Securities—Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10h-5 and the
Purchaser-Seller Limitation—Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps. '—In 1963, the United States filed a complaint under the
Sherman Act2 charging Blue Chip Stamp Company (Blue Chip),
Thrifty Drug Stores Co. and eight grocery store chains with conspir-
ing to restrain trade and monopolizing the trading stamp business in
California. This litigation was settled when a consent decree was
filed with, and accepted by, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. 3 In ,the decree, Thrifty Drug Stores
and the eight grocery store chains, which collectively owned 90
percent of the stock of Blue Chip (the stockholding users) consented
to offer to the non-stockholding users of Blue Chip trading stamps,
at bargain prices, stock in the contemplated Blue Chip Stamps
corporation. The stockholding users were to be divested of 55 per-
cent of their interest in Blue Chip when it was merged into Blue
Chip Stamps. Concomitantly, 55 percent of the common stock of the
new corporation, consisting of 621,600 shares, was to be offered in
units to the non-stockholding users. Each unit was to contain three
shares of stock in the new corporation and one $100 debenture, and
was to be offered for $101 on a pro rata basis determined by the
quantity of trading stamps which had been issued' to each of the
non-stockholding users during a specified period. Each unit had a
reasonable market value of $315. Any shares not purchased by the
non-stockholding users were to be sold on the open market. 4
The plaintiffs in Manor Drug were a group of the non-
stockholding users who claimed that, because of fraudulent informa-
tion which the defendants included in the prospectus for the units,
they refrained from purchasing the units to which they were enti-
tled, thereby incurring injury to the extent of the difference between
the fair market value and the offering price of the units to which
they had a right of first refusal. Basing their suit on violations of
section ,10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 and Securities
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. III 94,191 (9th Cir. 1973), as modified on
denial of rehearing en bane, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974). All subsequent citations to Manor
Drug will refer to the later opinion,
2 15 U.S.C. §* 1, 2 (1970).
3 United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp, 432, 433-34 (C.D. Cal, 1967).
4 Manor Drug, 492 F.2d at 139.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
	 directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-S 6 promulgated there-
under, the group claimed damages in the neighborhood of
$20,000,000. 7
Following the "purchaser-seller" rule formulated in Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 8 and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 9 the district court held that,
in order to attain standing, the plaintiffs had to be purchasers of the
securities for which they alleged damage caused by the defendants'
fraud. Accordingly, it dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of
standing to maintain the suit. 1 ° Over a vigorous dissent, the.court of
appeals reversed and HELD: from the plaintiffs' complaint, it did
not appear beyond doubt that the plaintiffs could prove no set of
facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief."
Proceeding from a description of the origins of the implied right
of civil action under Rule lob-5, this note will investigate two
important judicial developments affecting a plaintiff's standing to
maintain an action under the Rule: the "forced seller" theory, with
its emphasis on plaintiff's reliance; and the "aborted" transaction
cases which emphasize the plaintiff's status as a party to a contract.
Finally, tender offer cases arising under Rule lob-5 will be used to
demonstrate the continuing validity of the purchaser-seller limita-
tion and the crucial roles which reliance and contract play in Rule
10b-5 damage suits. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in support of its
grant of standing in Manor Drug will then be analyzed in light of
these developments.. It will be submitted that the theoretical basis
for the court's decision is unsound; and that the decision creates a
dangerous breach in the standing requirements for suits under Rule
1.0b-5 which can only exacerbate an already chaotic situation.
6 17 C.F.R.	 240.101)-5 (1973), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, schehe, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit; upon any person,
in connection with the purchaie or sale of any security.
7 See 492 F.2d at 146 (dissenting opinion). This figure is arrived at as follows: The total
number of shares (621,600) was to be divided into lots of three to be offered together with a
$100 debenture as a unit. Therefore, there would be 207,200 units each having a market value
of $315 but to be offered to the non-stockholding users for $101. See text at note 4 supra. The
difference, $214, multiplied te the number of units is $20,927,200. However, not all of the
non-stockholding users are suing here; therefore, the total amount sought in damages would
be less than the hypothetical maximum.
° 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
9 464 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1972).
to Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
I Id., citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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THE IMPLIED CIVIL REMEDY UNDER RULE 10b-5
Rule 10b-5 12 was promulgated by the SEC in 1942 to imple-
ment the protections afforded "investors" 13 under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). 14 On its face,
Rule 10b-5 provides for no private right of action to enforce its
sanctions or to recover for injuries resulting from a violation of the
Rule." However, beginning with the seminal decision in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.,I 6 every court which has considered the ques-
tion has found a private right of action implied in the language of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 17 In Kardon, the court based the
implied right of action on alternative theories: statutory tort and
statutory voidability.' 8 The statutory tort theory is grounded on
section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, 19 which states that the
invasion of an interest which the statute in question is intended to
protect gives to the individual holder of that interest a cause of
action in tort provided that the violation is recognized at law as a
12
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). For the text of the Rule, see note 6 supra.
13
 Rule 10b-5 does not contain the term "investors," see note 6 supra, but the courts have
determined that the Rule limits "investors" as used in § 10(b) to "purchasers and sellere of
securities. See, e.g., lierpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1970). Contra, Eason
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3595 (U.S. April 24, 1974).
14
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Rule 1013-5 was promulgated to protect sellers as well as
purchasers from fraud in connection with the sale of securities. See Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,.463-64 (2d Cir. 1952).
" For the text of the Rule, see note 6 supra. One commentator maintains that a private
right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is contrary to congressional intent, whether the
right be express or implied. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. L. Rev. 627 (1963),
18 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1961).
18 69 F. Supp. at 513-14.
19
 Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934) provides in pertinent part
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing
to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another
if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the
other as an individual; and'
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard,
the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and,
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion ..
Compare this 1934 statement of the implied liability arising from a statutory tort with
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965), especially comment d. The emphasis in the more
recent Restatement is upon deriving a standard of conduct from the terms of a statute rather
than explicitly creating a basis for liability when the terms of festatute are transgressed, as in
the original Restatement § 286. It is of interest to observe that the implied liability for
violations of Rule 10b-5 is derived from the section of the Restatement dealing with negli-
gence. Another continuing controversy in the 10b-5 area is whether or not scienter is required
to establish liability for fraud where the plaintiff is seeking damages. See Comment, Lance v.
Drexel & Co. and Rule 10b-5: Approaching the Scienter Controversy in Private Actions, 15
B.C. Ind, & Com. L, Rev. 526 (1974), and cases cited therein.
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cause of the invasion. Under this theory, a person injured by any
fraudulent activity employed in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security would have standing to establish a claim for relief
under Rule 10b-5.
The statutory voidability theory is based on section 29(b) of the
1934 Act. 2° The reasoning here is that, if a violation of Rule 10b-5
renders a contract void, the injured party to the contract must have
a remedy with respect to that contract. As slated by the court in
Kardon:
The statute would be of little value unless a party to the
contract could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of
obligations under it or to escape its consequences. . . .
[S]uch suits would include not only actions for recission but
also for money damages. 21
It is crucial at this point to observe that the right to a civil remedy
under Rule 10b-5 is implied only from the invasion of a legally
protected interest of an individual to whom the law extends a
remedy, and/or from a theory grounded in the standard law of
contracts. If the plaintiff cannot establish either that he is a member
of the class of persons which the statute was designed to protect, or
that his rights are based on contract, he has no standing to sue and
may not recover under Rule 10b-5. Although the Supreme Court has
removed any lingering doubt that an implied right of action does
exist under Rule 10b-5, 22 the issue , remains as to who has standing
to bring such an action. 23
20 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "Every contract made in
violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be
void."
21 69 F. Sum), at 514.
22 "It is now established that a private right of action is implied under §10(b)." Superin-
tendent of Ins, v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
23 A full discussion of standing is beyond the scope of this note; a short outline must
suffice. Most of the standing suits which have been decided by the Supreme Court have
involved citizen challenges to administrative action. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
These cases enunciated the premise that, in all suits before a federal court, there is an
irreducible constitutional component to standing found in the "case" and "controversy"
requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution: the plaintiff must have a
"personal stake" in the outcome of the•case. Flast v. Cohen, supra at 94, 101; Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970). Beyond this constitutional requirement, however,
the Supreme Court has stated that the plaintiff challenging administrative action must also
show that the interest he seeks to protect is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Data Processing,
supra at 153. But see Justice Brennan's criticism of this non-constitutional requirement in his
separate opinion in the companion cases of Data Processing and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 167-69 (1970) (separate opinion).
When the plaintiff seeks to gain standing on the basis of the violation of a statute, on the
other hand, it seems clear that he must bring himself within the class of persons the interests
of which the statute was designed to protect, in addition to showing the requisite personal
stake. Herpich v. Wallace, supra at:805-06; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
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LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
The language of Rule 10b-5 is extremely broad: "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . [t]o engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 24 If the terms were taken literally,
brokers and issuers of securities could be transformed into insurers
with respect to the securities which find their way into any investor's
hands. This is especially true if liability under Rule 10b-5 is not
conditioned upon a finding of scienter. 25 Exposing- brokers and
issuers (and any other person who purchases or sells securities) to
such unlimited liability could have a devastating effect upon the
operation of securities' markets. 26
Therefore, beginning with the landmark case of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 27 ,the courts have sought to limit the apPlica-
don of Rule 10b-5. 28 The Birnbaum court, after reviewing the
legislative history of section 10(b) and die administrative history of
Rule 10b-5, formulated a tripartite limitation on the scope of the
Rule. The protections of the Rule are aimed at (a) the "defrauded
purchaser or seller" of securities who is injured by (b) "that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the
sale or purchaSe of securities," (c) "rather than at fraudulent mis-
management of corporate, affairs." 29 The two substantive limita-,
tions, (b),and (c), have gradually been eroded to the point at which
they are virtually eliminated. 3 ° The procedural limitation, corn-
464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.• 956 (1952); cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971). The question is whether the plaintiff, under the pleading,
can prove any set of facts which would entitle him to relief under the statute. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The determination of standing is not limited to considera-
tions of financial injury to the plaintiff; indeed, he may have suffered economic loss and still
be barred from bringing his suit in federal court. Cf. Herpich v. Wallace, supra at 810.
Therefore, even though the plaintiff could show that he would have a personal stake in the
outcome, he must still bring himself within the terms of the statute in order to establish
standing.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the specific basis for standing in a Rule 10b-5 suit.
See Superintendent of Ins., supra at 13 n.10, where the Court expressly declined to rule on
standing issues. Cf. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir.
1973).
24
 17 C.F•R. § 240.1013-5 (1973). For the full text of the Rule, see note 6 supra.
25 See note 19 supra.
2U See492 F.2d at 147 n.8 (dissenting opinion).
27
 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
25
 Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
	 t
29 193 F.2d at 464.
3°
 The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have definitely rejected the idea that the
type of fraud covered by Rule 10b-5 is limited to that usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities. The Supreme Court quoted the Second Circuit with approval:
"We believe that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a
garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or
atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws."
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monly known as the "purchaser-seller limitation," has come under
severe attack31 since its introduction, but has been retained in
various forms. 32 Thus far, only one court of appeals has totally
rejected it; 33 the other courts of appeals have adopted and retained
it probably from fear that not to do so would flood the federal courts
with litigation. 34 Although not discarded, the purchaser-seller limi-
tation has undergone considerable evolution since its original formu-
lation in 1952. 35 Two modifications which have had a great impact
on the standing issue under Rule 10b-5 are the "forced seller" cases
and the "aborted" purchase or sale situations.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971), quoting Al%
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
The nucleus of the other substantive limitation, namely, that Rule 10b-5 does not
encompass internal corporate mismanagement, has survived but has been severely cir-
cumscribed, The Supreme Court has indicated that only where the sole issue is corporate
mismanagement does the case fall outside the scope of Rule 10b-5. Superintendent of Ins.,
supra at 12. See Dyer v, Eastern Trust & Bankihg Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 913 (D. Me.' 1971),
See generally A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5, 4.7(522) (1973).
H Only the Seventh Circuit has flatly rejected the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation.
Eason v. Genera] Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court, by a 5-3 vote, declined, however, to grant certiorari. 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. April 22,
1974). The Eason court treated standing as a pure jurisdictional question divorced from any
inquiry into the plaintiff's status as a member of a class which the statute is designed to
protect. Id. at 657. But see note 23 supra. However, the court then proceeded to investigate
whether the plaintiffs there, who were neither purchaiers nor sellers, "were members of the
class for whose special benefit Rule 10b-5 was adopted." Id. at 658. In the final analysis, it
seems that the court substituted the status of "investor" for "purchaser-seller" as a standing
limitation on 10b-5. Id. at 659-60. It furthermore appears that the court was explicitly inviting
the Supreme Court to define the scope of the class entitled to relief under 1013-5 by creating
this stark conflict among the circuits. Id. at 661.
32 See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).The SEC has repeatedly
requested that the courts overrule Birnbaum and discard the purchaser-seller limitation. See,
e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972); Iroquois Indus.,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909
(1970).
33 Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973). See note 31
supra. One district court thought that the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation had been
totally eliminated, Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), but the Second
Circuit rejected this view and reaffirmed the authority of Birnbaum in damage actions,
Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968).
34 Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J.), amended complaint
dismissed, [1967-69 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 92,243, at 97,140 (D.N.J.
1968); but see Eason, 490 F.2d at 660-61.
" Cf. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1967). The
purchaser-seller limitation has been eliminated in suits seeking injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir,), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Tully v.
Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972). Contra, Greater Iowa Corp.
v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 791 (8th Cir. 1967).
In Manor Drug, the majority's implied assertion that the plaintiffs could have obtained
injunctive relief under the facts presented is completely irrelevant to the issues in the case.
Even in the majority's development of its line of reasoning, it is a non sequitur, and the
inappositeness of the point is highlighted by the statement in which the majority concedes that
requirements for maintaining an action are more stringent in a damage suit (which is the case
in Manor Drug) than in an action for prophylactic relief.
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THE "FORCED SELLER"—RELIANCE
The "forced seller" doctrine emerged from the Second Circuit's
decision in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co. 36 In that case, the plain-
tiff (Vine) sued Beneficial. Finance Company for damages he al-
legedly sustained when Beneficial fraudulently accomplished a short
form merger with Crown Finance Company in which Vine was a
Class A stock minority shareholder. Vine claimed that the board of
directors of Crown conspired with Beneficial, with the result that
most of the money which Beneficial was to pay to acquire the
Crown stock reached the hands of the Crown directors, who owned
Class B stock. Beneficial made a tender offer to the Class A
shareholders and succeeded in obtaining 95 percent of the outstand-
ing shares although Beneficial paid the shareholders barely half of
what the stock was worth. Vine, who had refused to sell, brought
suit to recover damages for the defrauded Class A shareholders.The
defendants claimed that Vine had no standing since he had not sold
his shares. The Second Circuit rejected this argument and stated
that, beCause of Beneficial's fraud, Vine had been placed in the
position of a forced seller. 37 Once the merger was completed, the
only options remaining to Vine were to hold onto stock in a nonexis-
tent corporation, or exchange his shares for money from Beneficial
and thereby become a party to a "sale." Concerning the absence of
an actual sale, the court said:
It is true that appellant still has his stock; if he turned it in
for the price of $3.29 a share, it would be clearer that
appellant is a seller. Assuming that this would not other-
wise affect his right to sue under the Act and the Rule,
requiring him to do so as a condition to suit seems a
needless formality. 38
The court made it clear that the essential factor in finding Vine to be
a "seller" within the meaning of Rule lob-5 was the involuntary
nature of the alternatives imposed upon him: 39
We do not have here a stockholder who refuses to accept a
fraudulent offer to purchase his stock but remains a stock-
holder in an existing corporation; whether to label this .. .
'person a "seller" under the Rule is a much different ques-
tion. Due to defendant's acts, Crown has now disappeared
36 374 F,2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
37
 374 F.2d at 635.
38 Id. at 634.
39 Id. at 635. Accord, Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). But see Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain
Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 Buffalo L.




and plaintiff's stock has, in effect, been involuntarily con-
verted into a claim for cash. 4 °
Furthermore, the court declared that the plaintiff need not show
reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent representations in order to
have standing "in the limited instance where no volitional act is
required and the result of a forced ,sale is exactly that intended by
the wrongdoer."'"
However, it is arguably begging the question to concentrate on
the question Of plaintiff's reliance under the "forced seller" concept.
The plaintiff in the Vine case did not have to do anything to gain
standing; the action upon which the court grounded its grant of
standing was taken by others. These others arguably did rely: in
Vine, the selling shareholders relied on Beneficial's fraudulent con-
duct and tendered their shares. Hence, someone relied on the
defendant's deception. 42
4° 374 F.2d at 634.
• 41 Id. at 635. "In essence, because of the distinctive nature of the short form merger
procedure, appellee by deceiving A can cause B to become a seller." Id.
The "forced seller" doctrine is a good example of the reasoning processes which courts
have pursued in order to expand the classes of plaintiff which may obtain standing under Rule
10b-5 and still adhere to the purchaser-seller limitation which serves to prevent the expansion
from becoming an explosion, See Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 706,
708 (D.N.J. 1968). It is submitted that, if the purchaser-seller limitation is to be retained and
such an explosion of litigation is to be avoided, analytical precision and consistency must be
the guiding principle when a court considers the facts of a case arising under Rule 10b-5. The
confusion surrounding the present state of standing in Rule 10b-5 cases derives largely from a
failure by the courts to attain analytical precision. Kellogg, supra note 39. See also Whitaker,
The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 Ala. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1971). In other words,
once a rule of law for standing such as the purchaser-seller limitation has been adopted, a
plaintiff should be granted standing only if the facts he alleges logically bring him directly
• within the purview of the rule. Where a rule depends upon the greatest precision of analysis in
order to have any efficacy, it is a dangerously short step from derogation to demise. The
problem is further compounded because, every time a broadening of the purchaser-seller
limitation is effected, counsel will attempt to bring the facts of his client's case within the
holding. See Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1972).
Therefore, a decision based on imprecise reasoning can create chaos. Manor Drag, 492 F.2d
at 147 (dissenting opinion).
Logical consistency .is lacking in the majority's opinion in Manor Drug. The court gave
lip service to Birnbaum and then proceeded to create an exception to the rule; the opinion is
all the more unsettling because the majority apparently thought that it was remaining faithful
to Birnbaum principles. See text at notes 65-67 infra.
42 See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tex. L. Rev.
617, 634 (1971). The Supreme Court stated in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972), that, lulnder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." Id. at 153. Furthermore,
the Court stated that "tapl that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this
decision." Id. at 153-54. Here, the real basis for the plaintiffs' claim may not have been the
materiality of the nondisclosure, but reliance. In this case, the plaintiffs may have relied not
on any particular conduct of the defendants, but on the relationship between themselves and
the defendants through which relationship the defendants perpetrated a fraud upon the
plaintiffs in connection with their sales of stock. See A. Bromberg, supra note 30, 8,6(2).
The Court quoted a finding of the court of appeals that the plaintiffs, who sold their stock,
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It is therefore submitted that, even in the "forced seller" situa-
tion, it was necessary that someone rely on the defendant's fraudu-
lent conduct and that the plaintiff's injury causally result from that
reliance. In other words, the "forced seller" formulation does in fact
require that the plaintiff show reliance; it is simply that the reliance
need not necessarily be the plaintiff's own. In this case, there was
nothing remaining for the plaintiff to do; -he could only sell his stock
or lose his investment. But, even where the plaintiff had to do
nothing, the court's dedsion is premised upon a showing of reliance
by someone. In sum, it may be said that the two crucial factors in
the "forced seller" situation are reliance by others upon fraudulent
representations which places the plaintiff in the position of having to
make an involuntary sale. Although this case dispensed with the
requirement that the plaintiff show individual reliance, an element
of reliance is nevertheless central to standing.
In Manor Drug, on the other hand, the plaintiffs had a whole
host of options open to them; there was no question of involuntary
action. The crux of the case was whether the defendants' fraud had
actually caused them to act as they did. If the essential requirement
of individual reliance43 is dispensed with in an action for damages in
a misrepresentation case where the failure to purchase or sell could
have been the result of voluntary choice, the reliance element for
Rule 10b-5 standing will be obviated in toto. Although the plaintiffs
in Manor Drug alleged that they had relied to their detriment upon
the defendants' fraudulent representations, they pointed to no
affirmative acts taken by them to establish this reliance. 44 Absent
any ability to prove such affirmative reliance, or a set of facts which
would elevate the plaintiffs to the status of purchasers, 45 the plain-
tiffs should have been denied standing. The plaintiffs' contention
that the magnitude of the bargain of which they failed to take .
" 'considered these defendants to be familiar with the market for the shares of stock and relied
upon them when they desired to sell their shares.' " 406 U.S. at 152, quoting Reyos v. United
States, 431' F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970).
Consideration of cases involving the nondisclosure of a material fact as a violation of
Rule 10b-5 is beyond the scope of this note. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). However, the quoted passages
above from the Supreme Court's opinion in Affiliated We Citizens, supra, indicate that the
standard of proof for Causation in nondisclosure cases may be substantially different from
causation (as evidenced by reliance) in misrepresentation cases. Perhaps, in addition to the
"reasonable investor" test enunciated by the Court, there should be added the requirement
that the plaintiff prove that it is reasonable to infer that he individually would have
considered the nondisclosed fact to be material. This would serve to protect the defendant
from unlimited liability by establishing a standard similar to the individual reliance test in
misrepresentation cases. See text at notes 51-54 infra.
4}
 See Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433,•436 (6th Cir. 1969); Neuman v. Electronic
Specialty Co., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 92,591, at 98,704 (N.D.
1969); 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3876.77 (Supp. 1969); A. Bromberg, supra note 30,
8.6(1),
44 See 492 F.2d at 140.
45 See text at notes 60-62 infra.
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advantage was "so great as to provide, prima facie, an objective
basis for a factual inference that [non-stockholding] users properly
informed rather than misled would have accepted the Offer's° may
be accepted arguendo, but it will not serve as a substitute for
individual reliance which forms the basis for standing in Rule lob-5
damage actions based upon misrepresentations,
An argument based upon inferential reliance was presented to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., 47 where the plaintiffs
claimed that reliance could be inferred from alleged misrepresenta-
tions alone, and that they need not show that any particular plaintiff
had in fact failed to tender in reliance upon the defendant's
statements." The court rejected this inference and maintained that,
absent a showing of affirmative reliance, the failure to tender could
be imputed to "a reason such as avoidance of capital gains tax, or
simply . • , inertia."49 Accordingly, the court made it clear that only
those plaintiffs who could point to an affirmative act constituting
actual reliance would be permitted to sue. 3 °
Similarly, in Manor Drug, there was no showing by the plain-
tiffs of reliance in fact on the statements in the prospectus. Nor did
the plaintiffs' complaint negate the equally plausible inferences that
their failure to purchase the units resulted from lack of financial
ability, inertia, or actual rejection of the offer (which did not have to
be communicated to the defendants). Manor Drug vividly reveals
the dangers which a relaxation or elimination of the reliance element
could entail. 51 Here, the plaintiffs, who may well have failed to take
advantage of the bargain because they were financially unable, or
had made a positive decision not to avail themselves of it, or had
simply let the offer slip by, have now been granted standing to sue
for the benefits they previously failed to obtain. 52 The discovery of
the defendants' fraud may have been entirely fortuitous; but the
plaintiffs may be able to realize a fortune because of it. Concededly,
there will be some among the group of plaintiffs who really were
deterred from purchasing because of the fraud; but, the fact that the
defendants' reprehensible behavior allegedly caused injury to some
46
 492 F.2d at 142.
42 [1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec, L. Rep. 1I 92,591, at 98,701 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
48
 Id. at 98,705.
49 Id .
58 Id. at 98,706.
51 Cf. Boone & McGowan, supra note 45, at 622; Ruder, supra note 15, at 679-80.
52
 Such recovery would be in direct contradiction to § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78hb(a) (1970), which limits recovery under the 1934 Act to "actual damages." See note 53
infra. See also Restatement of Torts § 549, comment b (1938); Restatement (Second) of Torts §
549 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). The new § 549(2) would allow a "benefit of the bargain"
recovery as an alternative to "out of pocket" losses caused by the fraud. Id, But recovery
under the "benefit of the bargain" rule is predicated on the existence of a contract which was
not performed.
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plaintiffs" does not perforce require a federal remedy under Rule
10b-5. 54
Therefore, where the plaintiff offers no affirmative proof of
reliance on the fraudulent conduct, he should be denied standing
under Rule 10b-5. However, there may be other circumstances
where, even though there has been only a constructive sale or
purchase, the plaintiff may nevertheless bring suit—the "aborted"
transaction.
THE "ABORTED" PURCHASER OR SELLER—CONTRACT
The essential notion underlying the "aborted" transaction rule55
is that the plaintiff need not be a purchaser or seller to maintain
standing, but he must allege facts which could prove that he would
have become a purchaser or seller but for the defendant's fraud. 56 In
Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc.," Commerce Reporting
Company had entered into an agreement with Puretec, Inc. and
other defendants whereby Puretec was to sell all of its stock and
business to Commerce or its assigns. Commerce then contracted to
assign its purchase rights to the Puretec stock to Granite Equipment
Leasing Company in exchange for 5000 shares of Granite's stock.
Puretec consented to the assignment; subsequently, however, it
found a higher bidder for its stock and announced that it would sell
to that person. Commerce sued under Rule 10b-5, claiming that, but
for Puretec's fraud, its purchase of the Puretec - stock would have
been completed, 58 and that its sale of securities to Granite would
have been consummated. 59 The court found standing to sue on both
allegations and maintained that the use of the expansive phrase "in
connection with" in section 10(b) indicated that Congress sought to
protect against fraud affecting agreements to buy or sell, as well as
fraud connected with completed sales or purchases, provided that
injury could be shown. 6° It may be inferred that the agreement that
The plaintiffs in Manor Drug should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege
facts which could prove individual reliance and thereby gain standing. It is significant in this
connection to observe that § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970), does not
provide for punitive damages. Therefore, there should be no award of punitive damages
under Rule 10b-5. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969). See A. Bromberg, supra note 30, § 9.1. Accordingly, where a plaintiff cannot
establish the amount of actual damages, the court is powerless . to impose liability even though
the court believes that the imposition of liability would deter similar frauds in the future. See
Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
34
 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809 (5th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
35 See generally 6 L. Loss, supra note 43, at 3614-20.
56 Whitaker, supra note 41, at 568.
57 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N,Y. 1968).
5° Id. at 718-19.
59 Id. at 719,
F° Id. at 718. The court stated that, while a failure to consummate the purchase may
sometimes make it impossible for the plaintiff to prove damages and may thus preclude
recovery under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs simultaneous agreement to assign the Puretec stock
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Commerce entered into with Puretec would elevate Commerce to
the status of a statutory purchaser within the meaning of section
3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act. 61 In addition, Commerce's sale and assign-
ment of its contract rights would give Commerce the status of a
statutory seller under section 3(a)(14). 62
The sine qua non of standing in the "aborted" transaction
situations is the existence of an agreement or contract for the sale or
purchase of securities coupled with either fraudulent acts of the
defendant which prevented the plaintiff from performing according
to the contract, or the defendant's fraudulent failure to perform
which damaged the plaintiff. 63 The cases which have granted stand-
ing on the basis of an "aborted" transaction have not discarded the
requirement that the plaintiff be a purchaser or seller.
It is true that the purchaser-seller requirement has been
liberalized by expanded definitions of "purchaser" and
"seller." . . In each of [the cited] cases, however, the
plaintiff was found to be an actual or constructive "seller"
or "purchaser" of shares, and the fraud alleged was in
connection with such sale or purchase. The purchaser-
seller requirement was not eliminated. 64
Applying the "aborted" purchase rationale to the facts in Manor
Drug, it can be seen that the plaintiffs failed to bring themselves
to Granite indicated the availability of an appropriate measure of the plaintiffs injury. Id. at
719. In Manor Drug, the court reasoned in the opposite direction..The court used the consent
decree to establish the measure of damages and, a posteriori, found the functional equivalent
of a contract. 492 F.2d at 142. See note 66 infra. This reasoning fails on two grounds: (a) the
Majority's measure was not the true measure of damages, but merely the hypothetical
maximum amount of the defendants' liability, see note 7 supra; (b) the contract must be found
first, from which the measure of damages can be determined, as in Commerce Reporting. It
was logically inaccurate for the court to reason in, an a posteriori fashion. One cannot deduce
that a contract exists merely because some contract-like elements are present. A contract is a
conceptual synthesis of its necessary elements; when all of these elements are present, 'a
contract is deemed to exist. Perhaps the only two elements which are strictly necessary are an
offer and an acceptance (both broadly defined)—in any event, at least these two elements must
be present for a contract to exist. See Restatement of Contracts §§ 20, 22 (1932); Uniform
Commercial Code §§ 2-204 to..-206.- In Manor Drug, there was no acceptance (or conduct
indicating acceptance, see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(1)); therefore, it follows, that
there was no contract. In fact, it may be argued that a number of the factors which the court
considered to be indicia of a contractual relationship are not essential to a contract, e.g., price
and quantity. Sei Uniform Commercial Code 2-204(3). Of course, these elements would be
necessary to determine damages, but they are not essential for the existence of the contract,
for the violation of which the damages are sought, Manor Drug, 492 F.2d at 144 (dissenting
opinion).
61 290 F. Supp. at 719. Section 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C.	 78c(a)(13) (1970), provides: "The
terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
62 290 F. Supp. at 719. Section 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970), provides: "The
terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
63 See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972);
Goodman v. H. Rentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
64 Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 912 (I). Me. 1971) (citations
omitted).
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within the ambit of the theory. They did not allege any circum-
stances that would entitle them to have been considered construc-
tive, or statutory, purchasers. It is submitted that the majority erred
in finding otherwise. After reviewing "aborted" transaction cases,
including the Ninth Circuit decision in Mount Clemens Industries, _
Inc. v. Bell, 65
 the court concluded that "the consent decree involved
here serves the same function as the contractual relationship
necessary to confer upon the plaintiffs "statutory purchaser" status
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5; and, more specifically, that the
alleged facts brought the plaintiffs within the "aborted" purchaser
doctrine. 67
 However, the reasoning which the Manor Drug court
advanced to support this finding is spurious.
After noting that the plaintiffs could not have directly enforced
the consent decree," the court proceeded to demonstrate the way in
which the consent decree was nevertheless sufficiently like a con:.
tract to justify the grant of standing. The contractual characteristics
were found in that the decree: (a) required the defendants to offer (b)
particular securities to (c) a particular group of persons (d) for a
fixed price and (e) in a fixed amount." The court furtheimore stated
that the plaintiffs had "a right to buy those securities at a fixed price
and in a fixed amount. "70
Regardless of all these indicia of a contract, however, the
essential elements of a title contract are missing. No promise was
made by the defendants to the plaintiffs; although the consent
decree presented the plaintiffs with a lucrative opportunity, i.e., a
"bargain," there was rio bargain in the contractual sense. The "par-
ties" here neither exchanged nor made an agreement to exchange
any consideration. Manor - Drug had no contract rights which it
could enforce; the law provided it no remedy should the defendant
fail to fulfill the terms of the decree. There was no duty upon the
defendant to perform any promise to Manor Drug—the promise or
duty ran between the defendant and the government: 71 If the ar-
rangement is viewed as analogous to a "firm offer" 72 which the
65
 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972),
66
 492 F.2d at 142. The majority apparently realized the weakness of the comparison
between a contractual relationship and the consent decree because, in the original opinion in
Manor Drug, the majority stated that the consent decree was the "functional equivalent" of a
contractual relationship. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 94,191, at 94,820.
The weaker language in the modified opinion serves only to vitiate the majority's analogy.
AlsO note the new final paragraph in the modified .
 opinion, 492 F.2d at 142.
67 492 F.2d at 142.
68
 Id: at 142 n.14. •
h° Id. at 142.
7° Id. (emphasis added).
7 ' Id. at 138-39, 144 (dissenting opinion). Restatement of Contracts § I (1932) states: "A
contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 1 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1964) contains identical wording.
• 72
 See generally Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205. Cf. Eason v. General Motors




defendant was required to extend to Manor Drug, still there was no
contract formed because there was no acceptance."
It is manifest that the plaintiffs could not claim relief under the
consent decree because they were not a party to it. The majority
recognized this. 74 But the majority, after effectively admitting that
no contract or functional equivalent of one existed, proceeded to say
that that fact does not bar the plaintiffs' suit because the suit is not
based on a violation of the consent decree but on a violation of Rule
lob-5. 75
 The fact that there was a violation of Rule 10b-5, however,
is of no avail to the plaintiffs. In order to take advantage of Rule
10b-5 and the "aborted" purchaser doctrine, the plaintiffs must be
able to point to some agreement or contract:7° The consent decree
will not serve the same function as a contract, as the Majority
declared. An arrangement which lacks the most essential ingredient
of the offeree's contribution—acceptance—cannot possibly serve the
same function as a contract. The criterion which the majority itself
states must be present in order for the "aborted" purchaser rule to
apply—the prerequisite which is satisfied by the existence of a
contract—is entirely absent in Manor Drug: "proof . .
that the non-purchaser would in fact have purchased but for the
fraud . . . ." 77 Only a contract can "furnish objective evidence of the
reality of a plaintiff's intention to purchase . .. ."78 The criterion
was not established merely by adopting the plaintiffs' contention
that the "bargain" was so attractive that any reasonable person who
had not been misled would have snapped it up. 79
The majority in Manor Drug fully approved the Ninth Circuit
decision in Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Be14 8 ° which it had
decided the previous year. The plaintiffs in Mount Clemens claimed
that they were prevented frfirn purchasing securities at a sheriff's
sale because they had relied on the fraudulent representation that
73 "[A]n offeree can 'accept' an offer and form a contract only (1) by making a counter
promise and thus entering a 'bilateral contract,' or (2) by doing a requested act, and thus
binding the other party to a 'unilateral contract.'." L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract
Law 322-23 (3d ed. 1972).
74 492 F.2d at 142 n.14,
75 Id.
76 Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2(1 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1972).
77 492 F.2d at 141.
7$ Id. at 142.
79 See text at note 46 supra. An extremely interesting comment made by the court
appears near the end of the opinion: "It is also alleged that 60 per cent of those non-
stockholding users who did purchase the units offered them had information as to value not
made available by the defendant-appellees in the prospectus." Manor Drug, 492 F.2d at 142.
From this statement, it follows that 40% of those who did purchase had the same information
available to them as did the plaintiffs. Why did they purchase while the plaintiffs refrained
from doing so? See text at note 49 supra. The implication, urged by the plaintiffs, that the
fraudulent information supplied by defendants served as an all but absolute bar to purchase
seems considerably weakened in light of this action on the part of other non-stockholding
users.
" 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
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the securities were worthless." The Mount Clemens court conceded
that the facts of the case were very similar to the "aborted" purchase
cases but that one crucial element was missing: "The lack.. of a prior
contractual relationship ... is fatal to the contention of the appel-
lants here that they should be afforded standing as 'purchasers'
under the rationale of the 'aborted purchaser-seller' cases."" The
plaintiffs simply, had not provided any basis upon which a contrac-
tual relationship could be found, regardless of how liberally the term
"contract" was construed." Furthermore, the court refused to ac-
cept the SEC's contention that Birnbaum was incorrectly decided
and that the purchaser-seller limitation was too restrictive." In-
stead, the court adopted the Birnbaum doctrine for the Ninth Cir-
cuit betause it found "substantial and compelling reasons why
standing to . sue for money damages under [section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5j should be so limited.""
The majority in Manor Drug attempted to distinguish Mount
Clemens on its - facts by stating that, in Manor Drug, "[a]r' informed
decision by plaintiff-appellant to purchase these shares could not
have been thwarted by the intervention of an earlier or higher
bidder, as in Mount Clemens . . "86 But it is clear that the
plaintiffs in Mount Clemens were denied standing not because a
higher bidder could have intervened, but because they failed to
show any agreement with the defendant to purchase stock. 87 Manor
Drug is, therefore, factually indistinguishable from Mount Clemens,
and Mount Clemens should haye controlled Manor Drug."
THE TENDER OFFER CASES
Perhaps thet.most striking testimonial to the continuing vitality
of the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation as found in Mount
Clemens-  can be found in the cases dealing with "aborted" tender
offers where' the plaintiff did not attempt to sell his shares pursuant
to the ,t&icler offer because he relied on the fraudulent representa-
tions Of the defendant. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 89 Iroquois Industries invited shareholders of Syracuse
China to tender their shares for purchase. The management of
Syracuse resisted the tender offer and -fraudulently informed the
'I Id. at 345.
" Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).
83
 Id. at 346 n.12.
84
 Id. at 341. The SEC appeared as amicus curiae. See note 32 supra.
85 Id. at 342.
88
 492 F.2d at 142 n.15.
87 464 F.2d at 345-46 n.11.
88 See 492 F.2d at 143 n.1 (dissenting opinion). A possible explanation for this inconsis-
tency is that the panel which decided Mount Clemens, 464 F.2d at 340, was different from the
panel in Manor Drug, 492 F.2d at 138. Two of the judges on the Mount Clemens panel voted
to rehear Manor Drug en bane. 492 F.2d at 136.
89 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
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shareholders that Syracuse was negotiating a very favorable merger
with another company; the shareholders were advised not to tender.
As a result, Iroquois' effort failed. When Iroquois discovered the
fraud, it brought suit against Syracuse and its directors. The Second
Circuit reaffirmed Birnbaum9° and ruled that, since the plaintiff had
not accepted tendered shares (i.e., was not a purchaser), it had no
standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. 91 In support of its position, the
court referred to amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, enacted by Congress in 1968, which were designed to forbid
fraud in tender offers, 92 particularly section 14(e). 93
That Congress enacted the new Section 14(e) to pro-
hibit fraud by "any person'! in respect to tender offers is at
least an indication that in tender offer contests such as that
at bar there was no standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 by— _....
either the tender offeror or by the target corporation."
The plaintiff in Iroquois was denied standing because it could point
to no affirmative acts which would signify a contractual relationship
to make it a constructive purchaser. In Manor Drug, the same
argument may be applied to the plaintiffs who did nothing
affirmative to show their intention to actually purchase stock."
At first sight, Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co. 96 appears to
extend standing to non-sellers in a tender offer situation. In
Neuman, a tender offer was made to the shareholders of Electronic
90 417 F.2d at 970.
91 Id. at 965-70. See A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5, *6,3(1022)
(1973).
92 Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat, 454 (1968).
93 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicita-
tion of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
The House Report on the bill states that its purpose was to fill a gap in the securities laws
by requiring full disclosure by tender offerors to ensure that shareholders make their decisions
on the basis of adequate information. H.R Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2812-14 (1968). It appears that, until these amendments were
enacted, if an investor refrained from selling, in reliance on fraudulent representations by
someone resisting the tender offer, neither the sha ireholder nor the tender offeror would have
standing to sue for damages under Rule 10b-5. Iroquois, 417 F.2d at 969-70.
94 417 F.2d at 969. See Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973) (tender offeror
denied standing even though he alleged fraud since he could show "no relationship with
anyone either as a purchaser or seller of the securities involved with the alleged rule
violation," id. at 718).
es
 See text at note 44 supra.
96 ]1969-70 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec, L. Rep. 4 92,591, at 98,701 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
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Specialty Company (ESC) by International Controls Corp. (IC). The
directors of ESC, through false statements made to the ESC
shareholders, discouraged the shareholders from tendering. How-•
ever, on the last day of the duration of the tender offer, the
director-defendants withdrew their recommendation that the
shareholders not tender and indicated that they themselves would
tender their own shares to IC. At the same time, the defendants
advised the shareholders that a telegraphic tender would be accept-
able to IC, although the defendants in fact knew that such a mode
would be unacceptable to IC. Certain of the plaintiffs thereupon
sent to IC telegraphic tenders which were rejected. The tender offer
expired before the plaintiffs could transmit an alternate means of
tender.
The court, in granting standing to sue under Rule 10b-5, took
great pains to make it clear that, in order to recover damages," a
plaintiff must offer proof that he individually relied on the misrep-
resentations and, so relying, did not tender." The attempt to accept
the tender offer created a contractual relationship between the plain-
tiffs and IC; but for the defendants' fraud, the tender would have
been consummated. The court implied that plaintiffs who made no
attempt to tender would be denied standing. 99 In addition, the
Neuman court brought its holding within the purchaser-seller liinita-
tion by stating that the ,"plaintiffs can . . . be regarded as actual
sellers of securities. ,, loo
CONCLUSION
In sum, it may be said that, although the three situations
examined—the "forced seller," the "aborted" transaction, and the
tender offer—appear to represent erosions of . the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller limitation on standing to sue under Rule 10b-5, they
are in reality entirely consistent with the limitation.. It has not been
discarded or eroded; rather, the definitions of "purchaser" and
"seller" have been expanded to include within the purvieW of Rule
10b-5 persons who were not actual purchasers or sellers but con-
structive (and, therefore, statutory) purchasers or sellers.
The .plaintiffs in Manor Drug cannot be described as pur.chas-
ers, actual or constructive, no matter how flexibly "contract" is
interpreted. They therefore should have been denied standing in
accordance with the purchaser-seller limitation. The court in Manor
Drug was faced with a dilemma: it sought to extend the opportunity
97
 The plaintiffs sought to recover the difference between the tender offer price and the
price at which the plaintiffs and similarly situated persons could have or did sell their shares
after the termination of the tender offer. Id. at 98,702.
93
 Id. at 98,704. "[The problem[s] of causation and measure of damages which appear in
considering the private damage remedy under lOb-5 ... are logically overcome only where
individual reliance is proved as a condition of recovery." Id. at 98,705-06.
99
 Id. at 98,704.	 ,
100
 Id. at 98,705.
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for relief to the injured plaintiffs, but it was hampered by the
Birnbaum doctrine. Such a situation brings to mind the old adage
that "hard cases make bad law." It is submitted that Manor Drug
did make bad law; while claiming to adhere to the Birnbaum rule,
the court in fact violated it. The majority was probably disturbed by
the fact that the defendants would elude the grasp of the law even
though they may have caused injury to some of the plaintiffs. But
the concept of standing operates to deny access to the courts to
otherwise qualifying plaintiffs. The precise function is to limit the
classes of persons who may obtain relief under a statute. 101
If standing is to be extended to plaintiffs such as those in
Manor 'Drug, it should be accomplished legislatively and not
judicially. 1 ° 2 In Mount Clemens, the Ninth Circuit recognized the
"unquestionably sound principle" 103 stated by the Supreme Court in
Blau v. Lehman: 1 °4
Congress can and might amend [the Act] if the Commis-
sion would present to it the policy arguments it has pre-
. sented to us, but we think that Congress is the proper
agency to change an interpretation of the Act unbroken
since its passage, if the change is to be made.'"
The court in Mount Clemens maintained that, although the state-
ment in Blau referred to a request to expand the coverage of section
16(b) of the 1934 Act,'° 6 the argument applied with equal force
to a proposed exception to, or elimination of, the purchaser-seller
limitation. Even with such a limitation, the volume of litigation
under Rule 10b-5 has been spectadular. 1 °7 Removal of this valve
could produce an overwhelming flood of litigation; 108 this apprehen-
sion is prominently manifested in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Hufstedler in Manor Drug. 109
" 1 492 F.2d at 146 (dissenting opinion),
102 As a matter of fact, it could be changed by the SEC.
Since all of the jurisprudence in this area rests upon the flimsy foundation of this
innocuous-looking rule, the S,E.C. could, if it wanted to, codify the entire subject by
merely re-writing the rule. . . . I doubt that it has the slightest desire to accomplish
this result. -
Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule 106-57, 24 Bus. Law. 69, 75 (1968).
107 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972).
1 °` 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
"5 Id. at 413, quoted in Mount Clemens, 464 F.2d at 343.
"6 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
107 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967). See A.
Bromberg, supra note 95, § 2.5(6). From the plaintiff's point of view, Rule 1013-5 possesses
many advantages. The extent of this attractiveness is evidenced by the fact that the cases
brought under Rule 10b-5 comprise about one-third of all suits brought under all of the SEC
statutes. See id. §§ 2.5(6), 2.7(2), 4.7(120).
"a Bound Brook Water Co. v. Jaffe, 284 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D.N.J.), amended com-
plaint dismissed, (1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCI-I Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 92,243, at 97,140
(D.N.J. 1968). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660-61 (7th
Cir. 1973).
LOS 492 F.2d at 147-48 (dissenting opinion).
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the court in Manor Drug
should have fcillowed its analytically more precise decision in Mount
Clemens and concluded that the non-purchasing plaintiffs had no
standing to sue.
LARRY E. BERGMANN
Securities—Attorney's Opinion Letter in an Unregistered Sale
—Standard of Culpability in SEC Injunction Action—SEC v. Spec-
trum, Ltd:'—In an action by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) to enjoin twelve defendants from further alleged viola-
tions of the federal securities laws in connection with the illegal sale
of unregistered securities, 2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit 'reversed the district court's denial of an
injunction3
 in the case of defendant-appellee Stuart Schiffman—an
attorney who prepared an opinion letter on the basis of which some
of the unregistered securities allegedly were sold—and remanded for
an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of his role in the
scheme. 4
 The Second Circuit further directed that, should Schiff-
man be found liable as an aider and abettor of the scheme, the
standard of culpability to be applied would be that of negligence. 5
The Spectrum case involves a particularly complex fact situa-
tion and a large cast of characters; it is therefore necessary to outline
in perhaps greater than usual detail the events leading up to the
suit. On April 2, 1971 the SEC filed a complaint charging Spectrum,
Ltd. (Spectrum), appellee Schiffman, and ten other defendants with
participation in a scheme to distribute unregistered shares of Spec-
trum in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act
1 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
2 The SEC obtained permanent injunctions against at least ten of the defendants, but
was unsuccessful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against'defendant-appellee Schiffman.
Id. at 536. The SEC derives its authority to obtain injunctions from section 20(b) of the
Securitiei Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970), and section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). The purpose of such injunctive relief is to prevent
further violations of the securities laws by defendants.
The typical SEC fraud injunction restrains the defendant from making any
untrue statement of a material fact concerning a number of specific matters, or any
untrue statement of a material fact similar to those statements specifically set forth or
of similar purport or object. And the typical injunction under § 5 of the Securities
Act restrains any further offers or sales of any securities in violation of the registra-
tion or prospectus requirement, with an explicit exception normally for exempted
securities or transactions.
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1978 (2d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). Such relief does not
usually affect defendants' criminal or private civil liability.
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 93,631, at 92,868 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
489 F.2d at 541, 543.
5
 Id. at 541.
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